Utah v. Donald Arthur Harley : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Utah v. Donald Arthur Harley : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Janet C. Graham; Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Wesley M. Baden; Uintah County Legal Defender; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Harley, No. 981003 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1636
^JP ^, „ w 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, Appellate Case No. 981003-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 971800204 FS 
DONALD ARTHUR HARLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
AMENDED BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
Janet C. Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P. O. Box 140854-0854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Wesley M. Baden (4528) 
Uintah County Legal Defender 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
418 East Main, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 537 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
DONALD ARTHUR HARLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AMENDED BRIEF OF 1 
Appeal from the Judgment an< 
Eighth Distric 
Uintah County, Si 
Honorable A. Lynn 
 I   THE APPELLANT 
nd Order of Commitment 
t Court 
tate of Utah 
Payne, Judge 
Janet C. Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P. O. Box 140854-0854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Appellate Case No. 981003-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 971800204 FS 
Priority No. 2 
Wesley M. Baden (4528) 
Uintah County Legal Defender 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
418 East Main, Suite 210 
P. O. Box 537 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
RELEVANT FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. DICTA IN BROOKS CORRECTLY STATES THE 
LAW; AGGRAVATED BURGLARY ALWAYS 
REQUIRES PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT 
ENTERED OR REMAINED UNLAWFULLY; 
UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS THIS VIEW; 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY 
i 
INTERPRETATION SUPPORT IT; PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT OCCURRED DURING OPENING 
STATEMENT; PLAIN ERROR OCCURRED THEN; 
JURY INSTRUCTION 24 WAS ISSUED IN ERROR. 
II. JURY INSTRUCTION 18 WAS ISSUED IN ERROR; 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOLLOWED 
PERRY; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED 
TO CONSIDER TIME AND DISTANCE AS FACTORS 
IN DETERMINING WHETHER AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPING OCCURRED; FINLAYSON, ADOPTING 
THE BUGGS TEST, IS NOW CONTROLLING; 
HARLEY, IN THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, DID NOT 
COMMIT AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING. 
III. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
AND TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE CONVICTIONS. 
CONCLUSION 
ADDENDUM 
Attachment A: Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Kidnaping, 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, and Tampering with 
Evidence Statutes 
Attachment B: State's Concession, at Preliminary Hearing, 
that Harley Did Not Enter the Jenkins' House 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1973) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(l)(a) (1983) 26 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1996) 1, 6, 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1973) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1989) 2, 6, 7, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1973) 2, 6, 7, 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (1997) 2, 6, 7, 32 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) 2 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 19(c) 4, 20 
UTAH CASES 
Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
949 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1997) 16 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984) 17 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988) 16 
State v. Betha, 341 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (CA, 4-23-98), 
P.2d (Utah App. 1998) 15 
State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) 7, 12, 13, 14 
State v. Bryant, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (CA, 8-13-98), 
P.2d (Utah App. 1998) 5, 25 
iii 
State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981) 26, 27 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 4, 20 
State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1998) 22, 27, 28, 30 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378 (Utah App. 1992) 5, 6 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 26 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995) 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708 (Utah App. 1990) 20 
State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994) 14 
State v. Rudolph, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (SC, 7-31-98), 
P.2d (Utah 1988) 15 
State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997) 9 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2, 5 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 4, 21 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) 3, 19 
NON-UTAH CASES 
State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (Kan. 1976) 22, 28, 30 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
DONALD ARTHUR HARLEY, ; 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Appellate Case No. 981003-CA 
) Trial Court Case No. 971800204 FS 
) Priority No. 2 
AMENDED BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Donald Arthur Harley, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals his 
jury convictions for two counts of aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1996); one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree 
1 
felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1989); one count of possession of a dangerous 
weapon, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (1997); and one 
count of tampering with evidence, as a party, a second degree felony, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-510 (1973). The supreme court poured over this appeal to the court of 
appeals, which has jurisdiction to hear it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)(i) 
and 78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 
Did the trial court err when it denied Harley's motion to dismiss the one 
count of aggravated burglary at preliminary hearing, on grounds that Harley never 
entered the Jenkins' house and the State conceded the point? Standard of review: 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
Issue 2 
Did the trial court err when it convicted Harley of one count of aggravated 
2 
burglary, despite the fact that Harley never entered the Jenkins' house and the State 
conceded the point? Standard of review: A trial court's conclusions of law in 
criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, supra. 
Issue 3 
Was there prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor, in opening 
statement, argued to the jury that aggravated burglary does not require the actor to 
enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling? Standard of review: Prosecutorial 
misconduct occurs when the actions or remarks of the prosecutor call to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining 
its verdict and, under the circumstances of the particular case, the error is substantial 
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there 
would have been a more favorable result. State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 
(Utah App. 1995). 
Issue 4 
Did plain error occur when the trial court, over Harley's objection, allowed 
the prosecutor, in opening statement, to argue to the jury that aggravated burglary 
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does not require the actor to enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling? Standard of 
review: Plain error occurs when there is an error, it should have been obvious to the 
trial court, and it is harmful to the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993). 
Issue 5 
Did the trial court err in issuing jury instruction 24, stating that an attempt to 
unlawfully enter a building or any portion thereof is an element of the offense of 
aggravated burglary? Standard of review: Even without a formal objection on the 
record, appellate courts will review instructions for error in order to avoid manifest 
injustice. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). The standard of review utilized is plain error. 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). 
Issue 6 
Did the trial court err when it convicted Harley of two counts of aggravated 
kidnaping, by barring defense counsel as matter of law from arguing, in closing 
argument, that time and distance were important jury considerations in the 
determination of whether there had been a seizing, confining, detaining or 
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transportation within the meaning of the aggravated kidnaping statute? Standard of 
review: A trial court's interpretations of law in criminal cases are reviewed for 
correctness. Thurman, supra. 
Issue 7 
Did the trial court err in issuing jury instruction 18, over Harley's objection, 
informing the jury that neither time nor distance are elements of aggravated 
kidnaping and that to prove the offense the State does not need to show that the 
victim was seized, confined or detained for any particular amount of time or 
transported for any particular distance? Standard of review: The standard of review 
for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is correctness. State v. Bryant, 
348 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (CA, 8-13-98), P.2d (Utah App. 1998). 
Issue 8 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Harley of possession of a dangerous 
weapon? Standard of review: Defendant must marshal all evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and must then show this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992). 
Issue 9 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Harley, as a party, of tampering with 
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evidence? Standard of review: Defendant must marshal all evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and must then show this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Lemons, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302, Aggravated kidnaping. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a). Possession of a dangerous weapon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510. Tampering with evidence. 
These statutes are set forth verbatim in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State charged Harley with five counts: (I) aggravated kidnaping of Ted 
Jenkins, a first degree of felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1996); 
(II) aggravated kidnaping of Darrell Jenkins, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1996); (III) aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1989); (IV) possession of a dangerous 
weapon, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503(3)(a) 
(1997); and (V) evidence tampering, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-8-510(1973). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Preliminary hearing was held on June 20, 1997. Harley, ^ t that time, moved 
the court to dismiss count three, aggravated burglary, specifically on grounds that he 
did not enter the Jenkins' home and the State conceded the point. See Prelim. Tr. 
81 f, 92. In support Harley cited State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995), 
containing dicta by then Chief Justice Zimmerman, at 862, that "Aggravated 
burglary always requires proof that the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in 
a building." The trial court denied Harley's motion. It subsequently bound him 
over on all charges. 
Ultimately a two-day jury trial was held on September 22 and 23, 1998. At 
trial the State conceded, in opening statement, that neither Harley nor Gooch 
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entered the Jenkins' home. See Tr. 168,11. 21-24: "[I]n this case, we are not going 
to argue that the burglary occurred because they entered the house. There will be 
no evidence that they entered the house." 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The jury found Harley guilty on all five counts. The trial court subsequently 
sentenced him to the Utah State Prison as follows: Count (I), aggravated kidnaping 
of Ted Jenkins, five years to life, with a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen 
years; Count (II), aggravated kidnaping of Darrell Jenkins, five years to life, with a 
minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years; Count (III), aggravated burglary, five 
years to life; Count (IV), possession of a dangerous weapon, zero to five years; and 
Count (V), tampering with evidence, one to fifteen years. Counts (I), (II), (IV) and 
(V) were to be concurrent with each other but consecutive to Count (III). In 
addition, Harley was ordered to serve one additional year, consecutive to all other 




In reviewing a jury verdict, the court views the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. Harley recites 
the facts of this case accordingly. State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 379 (Utah App. 
1997). 
Ted and Betty Jenkins are a retired married couple living in Vernal, Utah. Tr. 
184. On May 21, 1997, at home, the Jenkins' babysat their granddaughter. Tr. 185. 
About 9:30 p.m. their son, Darrell Jenkins, picked up the child. Id. Darrell and she 
went to their own home which is next door, 100-150 feet away. Tr. 183. Ted and 
Betty Jenkins then prepared to go to bed. Tr. 186. 
A little later, Donald Arthur Harley and Harry Gooch drove into the Jenkins' 
driveway and got out of their van. Unknown to Harley and Gooch, Ted Jenkins had 
heard the vehicle, and his suspicions aroused, gone out the back door and around 
the side by a back gate to investigate. Tr. 189. Gooch went to the front door and 
knocked. However, when Betty opened the door, no one was there. Tr. 319. 
Harley was talking with Jenkins by the back gate. Gooch joined them. Tr. 191. 
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At that point Harley and Gooch tried to grab Jenkins, the latter yelled for help, and 
Harley announced, "This is a robbery" and demanded entry into the house. Tr. 192-
93. During the scuffle Jenkins was knocked to the ground and sustained a cut to his 
head. Id. Hearing his father's scream, Darrell Jenkins immediately ran over from 
his house. Tr. 214. He saw Gooch holding a pistol. Id. He subsequently saw 
Harley holding it, when Harley and Gooch marched them to the back door of the 
house. Tr. 216. The back door was locked. Tr. 215. Betty Jenkins had observed 
what had happened, locked the door and phoned 911 for help. Tr. 320-21. 
Realizing that their plan had gone awry, Harley and Gooch turned away and fled. 
Tr. 217. They jumped in their van and headed north out of town. Id. Dan-ell 
Jenkins ran to his vehicle in his drive way, caught up with and followed Harley and 
Gooch, and during this time used a cell phone to speak with the 911 operator and 
give police directions. Tr. 218. Police intercepted and arrested Harley and Gooch. 
Tr. 241. While in pursuit, police observed a pistol thrown from the van. Tr. 243. It 
was recovered and placed into evidence. Tr. 245. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Harley has been wrongly convicted of aggravated burglary. Aggravated 
burglary always requires proof that the actor entered or remained unlawfully in a 
dwelling. Harley never entered the Jenkins' house; the State conceded that point at 
both preliminary hearing and trial. Therefore Harley could not have committed 
aggravated burglary. Utah case law supports the view that a necessary element of 
aggravated burglary is entering or remaining. Fundamental principles of statutory 
construction support the view. Prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the 
prosecutor, in opening statement, informed the jury that aggravated burglary does 
not require entering. Plain error occurred then as well. Jury instruction 24, defining 
aggravated burglary as attempting to enter a building, was issued in error. 
Harley also has been wrongly convicted of aggravated kidnaping. His 
detention of Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins was slight, inconsequential and merely 
incidental to another crime. Detention was inherent in the other crime. Detention 
had no significance independent of the other crime in that it made the other crime 
substantially easier to commit or substantially less likely to be detected. Jury 
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instruction 18, stating that time and distance need not be considered in determining 
whether kidnaping occurred, was issued in error. It also was error that defense 
counsel, in final argument, was precluded from arguing that time and distance were 
important jury considerations in the determination of whether an aggravated 
kidnaping had occurred within the meaning of the law. Harley, in the facts of this 
case, did not commit aggravated kidnaping of either Ted Jenkins or Darrell Jenkins. 
There is insufficient evidence to support Harley's conviction for either 
possession of a dangerous weapon or tampering with evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DICTA IN BROOKS CORRECTLY STATES THE LAW; 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY ALWAYS REQUIRES 
PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT ENTERED OR 
REMAINED UNLAWFULLY; UTAH CASE LAW 
SUPPORTS THIS VIEW; FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
SUPPORT IT; PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
OCCURRED DURING OPENING STATEMENT; 
PLAIN ERROR OCCURRED THEN; JURY 
INSTRUCTION 24 WAS ISSUED IN ERROR. 
A. The Aggravated Burglary Statute 
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Harley's first assignment of error is that he was bound over and subsequently 
convicted of aggravated burglary despite the fact that he did not enter a dwelling 
and the State conceded the point. He argues that because he did not enter or 
remain, that is, because he did not engage in burglary, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
202(1), he did not engage in aggravated burglary. This argument finds support in 
then Chief Justice Zimmerman's dicta in Brooks: "Aggravated burglary always 
requires proof that the defendant entered or remained in a building...." Brooks, 
supra, at 862. 
The State, at preliminary hearing and trial, pointed to the language in the 
aggravated burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203: "(1)A person is guilty of 
aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the 
actor or another participant in the crime: (a) causes bodily injury to any person who 
is not a participant in the crime; (b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime;..." 
(emphasis added). It argued that Harley's attempt to enter the Jenkins' house, 
coupled with the injury to Ted Jenkins and use of a pistol, constituted aggravated 
13 
burglary within the meaning of the statute. 
Harley believes that the State reads the statute too expansively and for that 
reason incorrectly. Chief Justice Zimmerman, in Brooks, was fully aware of the 
phrase "attempting" in the definition of aggravated burglary. He included it in his 
quotation of the statute. Id. He nonetheless persisted in stating that, for aggravated 
burglary to occur, the actor must enter or remain unlawfully in a building. 
The dicta in Brooks, while dicta, is a correct statement of the law. The court 
of appeals has interpreted the aggravated burglary statute in a consistent manner. 
See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994). In Peterson, defendant was 
convicted of aggravated burglary. At issue was the trial court's refusal to give 
requested jury instructions for lesser included offenses including attempted 
aggravated burglary. The court of appeals upheld the trial court, on grounds that 
another participant in the crime had entered the victim's dwelling. The court 
pointed out, in a footnote, that "If entry occurred, the attempt offenses would 
logically be excluded." At 968, n. 3. This implies, at the very least, that if the other 
participant in the crime did not enter or remain unlawfully the jury should have 
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received defendant's requested instruction for attempted aggravated burglary. The 
court of appeals clearly is saying that "attempting ... a burglary," as that phrase is 
used in the aggravated burglary statute, is not identical to attempted aggravated 
burglary when the actor does not enter or remain. 
Two more recent discussions of aggravated burglary demonstrate that entry or 
remaining is a necessary element of the crime. In State v. Betha, 341 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8 (CA, 4-23-98), P.2d (Utah App. 1998), the court upheld defendant's 
conviction of aggravated burglary. The elements of aggravated burglary presented 
at trial were reviewed. They were "that defendant (1) entered and remained 
unlawfully in [the victim's] apartment; (2) with intent to commit a felony or an 
assault; and (3) while committing the burglary ... both caused bodily injury ... and 
used and threatened to use a gun..." (emphasis added). At 13. In State v. Rudolph, 
349 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (SC, 7-31-98), P.2d (Utah 1998), the court upheld 
defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary, in part on grounds that while 
defendant did not have intent to commit an assault upon entry he did form the 
necessary intent while remaining unlawfully. 
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Consistent with these cases, Harley believes that the unambiguous meaning of 
the aggravated burglary statute, specifically the phrase "attempting ... a burglary," is 
that the actor must make an attempt of some kind after he already has entered a 
building or dwelling. Numerous scenarios suggest themselves. For example, an 
actor possessing a dangerous weapon could attempt to remain inside a home after 
permission to be there has been revoked. The actor is attempting a burglary. 
However, an actual aggravated burglary is involved because the actor possesses a 
dangerous weapon. The court of appeals should continue to interpret the aggravated 
burglary statute in this manner, that is, in conformity with its plain meaning. "'A 
fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in the 
statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning.'" 
Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 949 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1997) 
(quoting Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988)). 
The aggravated burglary statute, in its present form, does not expressly 
extinguish the crime of attempt, Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101. Therefore attempt, as 
an offense, and aggravated burglary, as an offense, stand as separate and equal parts 
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in the criminal code. To read the aggravated burglary statute, as the State urges, in 
effect would eliminate attempted aggravated burglary as a crime. This itself violates 
other fundamental principles of statutory construction. Separate parts of an act 
should not be construed in isolation from the rest. The meaning of any part of an act 
should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Jensen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). The legislature clearly intends 
attempted aggravated burglary to remain a separate offense, not subsumed under 
aggravated burglary. Attempted aggravated burglary, as distinct from aggravated 
burglary, can take many forms. One example is that an actor did not enter or remain 
unlawfully in a building or dwelling, but in attempting to do so, he possessed or 
used a dangerous weapon or caused a victim bodily injury. 
Harley consequently urges the court of appeals to hold that aggravated 
burglary requires that the actor enter or remain unlawfully in a building or dwelling. 
Such a holding is dictated by Chief Justice Zimmerman's correct statement of the 
law in Brooks, analysis of the elements of aggravated burglary in other case law in 
this jurisdiction, and fundamental principles of statutory interpretation including 
17 
plain meaning and harmonization of statutes. 
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Harley next assigns as error the prosecutor's interpretation of the aggravated 
burglary statute as not requiring entry or remaining, during opening statement. The 
following exchange took place at the beginning of trial: 
[Ms. Stringham]: ...[T]his defendant is charged with aggravated burglary. An 
aggravated burglary occurs when there is bodily injury caused or uses or threatens 
the use of a dangerous weapon. When that occurs it becomes aggravated burglary. 
And, in that particular case, you don't have to enter a house to commit a burglary. 
Statute says attempting. 
[Mr. Baden]: ...I would object. I believe that Miss Stringham is improperly--
is arguing the law during her opening statement. And if the court wishes to overrule 
me, I just ask that the court note my exception for the record. 
[Ms. Stringham]: And I am done, your Honor. 
[The Court]: You may continue. I'll overrule that. A very brief statement as 
to the law is, I think, appropriate in this situation. I don't think she's gone beyond 
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where she should go. 
[Ms. Stringham]: Thank you, Judge. So, in this case, we are not going to 
argue that the burglary occurred because they entered the house. There will be no 
evidence that they entered the house. I just want to remind you to remember—and, 
again, you will get the jury instructions—an aggravated burglary can occur because 
there was bodily injury. If you find there was bodily injury or a dangerous weapon, 
simply attempting to commit a burglary is sufficient. Tr. 168,1. 4 to 169,1.3. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the prosecutor misstated the law— 
that in her words aggravated burglary does not require entry or remaining 
unlawfully—prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Harley acknowledges the 
recognized two-part test for such misconduct: '"the actions or remarks of [the 
prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in 
considering in determining its verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result.'" State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. 
19 
Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990)). Here, the prosecutor misstated the 
law, thereby calling to the jury's attention a matter it was not justified in considering 
in determining its verdict. Had the jury been informed properly, it would not have 
convicted Harley of aggravated burglary since he did not enter or remain unlawfully 
in the Jenkins' home. 
C. Plain Error 
In the alternative, plain error occurred. The three-part test for plain error, 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), is satisfied readily. An error 
occurred, specifically the prosecutor's misstatement of law during opening 
statement. The error should have been obvious to the trial court. It was put on 
notice, at preliminary hearing, that the aggravated burglary statute requires entry or 
remaining. The error was harmful. Harley was convicted of an offense that he in 
fact did not commit. 
D. Jury Instruction 24 
Harley next assigns as error jury instruction 24. That instruction stated, in 
part, "[P]roof of the commission of the crime of Aggravated Burglary as charged in 
20 
the Information requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following: 
1. Donald Arthur Harley;... 4. Did himself, or as a party, attempt to unlawfully 
enter a building or any portion thereof;...." Harley, as a matter of record, did not 
object to the instruction given objections already raised at preliminary hearing and 
earlier at trial. Failure to object is not fatal, however, as appellate courts review 
jury instructions for error in order to avoid manifest injustice. Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(c). The standard of review utilized is plain error. State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 
121-22 (Utah 1989). Plain error already has been discussed, supra. Here, in brief, 
an error occurred, namely that instruction 24 did not correctly define the offense of 
aggravated burglary. The error should have been obvious because of repeated 
discussions involving counsel and the court about the proper definition of 
aggravated burglary. The error harmed Harley because he was convicted of an 
offense without any proof whatsoever about a key element, entering or remaining 
unlawfully in the Jenkins' home. 
21 
II. JURY INSTRUCTION 18 WAS ISSUED IN 
ERROR; THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
FOLLOWED PERRY; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER TIME AND 
DISTANCE AS FACTORS IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING 
OCCURRED; FINLAYSON, ADOPTING THE 
BUGGS TEST, IS NOW CONTROLLING; 
HARLEY, IN THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, 
DID NOT COMMIT AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPING. 
A. Jury Instruction 18 
Harley next assigns as error jury instruction 18. Counsel and the court met in 
chambers the morning of the second day of trial, prior to the resumption of 
testimony, to discuss jury instructions. The meeting was unrecorded. Tr. 351. 
Counsel and the court also met in chambers during the mid-day recess, to discuss 
instructions. That meeting was recorded. Tr. 344 f. On both occasions, objection 
was made to State's proposed instruction 18. The following colloquy occurred 
between defense counsel and the court: 
[Mr. Baden]: Your Honor, for purposes of making a record, I would like to 
read the proposed jury instruction. It states, "With respect to the charge of 
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Aggravated Kidnaping, if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant seized, confined, detained, or transported a person as alleged, the State 
has proven that element of the offense. Neither time nor distance or (sic) elements 
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnaping. The law does not require the State to 
prove a victim was seized, confined, detained for any particular amount of time or 
transported for any particular distance... " (emphasis added). 
Your Honor, I know that the proposed instruction is based on ... State v. 
Perry [899 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995)]. I wonder, though, to what extent the 
holding in Perry should apply to this case.... 
...[WJhat's very troubling to me about the proposed instruction ... is that the 
instruction here would seem to eliminate the jury in considering time and distance as 
facts among the totality of facts in this case to help them reach a determination 
whether there is a seizing, or ... an attempted seizing. 
If the jury in this case is going to try to distinguish between a seizing and an 
attempted seizing, it seems to me all the facts have to come into play, have to be 
considered by the jury. Certainly, one of those facts is the time that, well, in this 
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case, that somebody was scuffling with the victim. Also, I think what's a very 
important fact in this case is the distance between the back gate and the back door 
which the victim testified was only 15 to 18 feet and, therefore, would apply [sic] 
only a very small time period. These time periods are certainly much less than the 
four minutes that the victim in Perry case was restrained in the car at knife point. 
...[T]he proposed instruction that the court wishes to give seems to me to, 
arguably, go beyond the holding in Perry. And what's very troubling again, is that 
it seems to deny the jury to look at the totality of facts, including time and distance, 
in making a determination on the very important issue in this case of whether there 
has been a seizing or attempting seizing. 
...[The Court]: I am going to give the instruction that has been prepared, and 
do that because I think it's in conformance with the Perry case. I believe that you 
can talk about anything up to the point of seizure. You can argue seizure or 
confinement, but you can't argue that it needs to be for a particular period of time or 
that it didn't occur because it was of short duration. 
...[Mr. Baden]: Your Honor, may I ask, am I precluded, in closing argument, 
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as I would like to do, to argue time and talk again about literally the seconds that 
went by in this incident? 
[The Court]: You can talk about—you cannot argue that it didn't occur 
because it wasn't a long enough distance, or that it wasn't enough time. ...Well, 
before the seizure you can argue anything. And the jury should be given to 
understand that all they want—I want them to understand once they have been 
contained or restrained, or whatever it is, or transported, once they find any of those 
things have occurred, they don't have to say he was transported 50 or 100 feet or a 
mile. Doesn't make any difference. If they are transported, the first step meets the 
statute. If they are detained, the first moment meets the statute. It's not-don't have 
to prove anything more. That's what I thought I told you. Tr. 349,1. 1 to 354,1.5. 
Harley believes that instruction 18, given over his objection, was error. "The 
standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is 
correctness." State v. Bryant, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (CA, 8-13-98), P.2d 
(Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). "[Correctness means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
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determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Perry is significant because-on the surface at least-it appeared to deviate 
from State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981) and eliminate temporal 
considerations in the offense of aggravated kidnaping. Defendant in Couch had 
been charged with both kidnaping and sexual assault. In response, he argued that to 
be convicted of kidnaping there needed to be proof the detention was longer than 
the minimum inherent in the commission of the sexual assault. Otherwise, the State 
could transform virtually every sexual assault into a kidnaping, a more serious 
offense with a heavier sentence. The court in Couch agreed. However, in Perry, an 
aggravated kidnaping case, the court observed that the aggravated kidnaping statute 
was devoid of a temporal element, as opposed to the kidnaping statute, which, in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-301(1 )(a), makes reference to detaining or restraining 
another "for any substantial period." The court stated, "Nowhere does this statute 
require the victim be detained or restrained for any period of time before the crime 
of aggravated kidnaping occurs. ...It is the element of restraint with the intent to 
inflict injury or terrorize, not the length of restraint, which constitutes an aggravated 
26 
kidnaping under Utah law" (emphasis in original). At 1242. Perry, seemingly, 
stands for the proposition that time and distance are not factors in aggravated 
kidnaping. 
If so such a view is harsh and illogical. With defendant in Couch Harley 
argues that a seizing or detaining is inherent in numerous crimes. Any robbery, 
necessarily, involves a detaining. So too do sexual offenses. Without consideration 
of the totality of the facts, including time and distance, all of those offenses suddenly 
mutate and become aggravated kidnapings. Those accused face the possibility of 
greater penalties than they would normally. For example robbery, a second degree 
felony, punishable by 1-15 years imprisonment, is treated as aggravated kidnaping, a 
first degree felony with a minimum mandatory sentence of six years, up to life. 
Attempted aggravated robbery, also a second degree felony, is treated as aggravated 
kidnaping with the same result. 
B. Finlayson. and Time and Distance 
Perhaps for these very reasons the court of appeals wisely has tempered 
Perry. See State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998). Defendant in 
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Finlayson was convicted of aggravated kidnaping, forcible sodomy and rape. The 
court reversed the aggravated kidnaping conviction, holding that the detention 
involved was not sufficiently independent of the sodomy and rape. At 289-90. In 
determining the nature of the detention the court appeared to adopt, for the first time 
in Utah, the three-part test found in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720, 
731 (Kan. 1976). To find that a detention or movement of a victim is significantly 
independent of another crime, to justify a separate conviction for kidnaping, the 
detention or movement '"(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely 
incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the 
other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in 
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessens the risk of detection.'" At 289 (quoting Buggs). 
Harley approves the apparent adoption of the Buggs test and believes that had 
instruction 18 not been given and defense counsel been allowed to argue the totality 
of facts at trial, including time and distance, the test in effect would have been 
applied to his case and the result would have been different. While defense counsel 
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was not allowed to proceed as he wished in closing argument, certain facts were 
adduced at trial. Ted Jenkins testified that the scuffle that took place between him 
and Harley and Gooch lasted a "very short time" and could have been only seconds 
long. Tr. 200,11. 10-13. He also testified that the distance between the back gate, 
near where the scuffle occurred, and the back door of the house, which was locked, 
was fifteen to eighteen feet. Tr. 204,11. 1-6. Darrell Jenkins testified that after 
hearing his father scream he ran over from his house in seconds. Tr. 225,1. 18 to 
226,1. 11. Betty Jenkins testified, variously, that thirty to sixty seconds went by as 
she heard her son's running, went outside and peaked around the corner of the 
house, then went back into the house and phoned 911. Tr. 328,1. 25 to 330,1. 7. 
Laconna Davis, the 911 operator, testified that she received Betty Jenkins' call at 
10:18:28 p.m. and Darrell Jenkins' call, when he was in pursuit of Harley and 
Gooch, at 10:19:42 p.m., some seventy-four seconds later. Tr. 263,11. 2-3 and 266, 
1. 25 to 267,1. 4. 
These facts, taken together, clearly demonstrate that Harley's detention of 
Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins was slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to 
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another crime, arguably either attempted robbery or attempted burglary. The 
detention, here, was inherent in the other crime. The detention did not make the 
other crime substantially easier to commit or substantially less likely to be detected. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Buggs gives several illustrations of when 
detention does or does not amount to kidnaping. Harley believes that one 
illustration is particularly instructive: "'The forced direction of a store clerk to cross 
the store to open a cash register is not a kidnaping; locking him in a cooler to 
facilitate escape is.'" Quoted in Finlayson, id. He argues that moving Ted Jenkins 
and Darrell Jenkins from the back gate to the back door of the house is analogous to 
moving a store clerk from a spot in the store to the cash register. Such movement 
may be part of another crime. It does not constitute kidnaping. 
In sum, instruction 18 misstated the law. Time and distance, technically, are 
not elements in the offense of aggravated kidnaping. However, they are not 
irrelevant in determining whether a seizing, confining, detaining or transporting has 
occurred that is significantly independent of another crime to justify a separate 
conviction for kidnaping. Harley had the right to argue the totality of facts in his 
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case, including time and distance, and attempt to convince the jury that he should 
not be found guilty of two counts of aggravated kidnaping. Instruction 18, in 
addition to misstating law, barred him from doing so. Defense counsel, in closing 
argument, was precluded from arguing facts and suggesting to the jury that the 
detention of Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins did not rise to the level of aggravated 
kidnaping within the meaning of the law. Had counsel been able to do so, there is a 
strong possibility, at the very least, that the outcome of Harley's trial would have 
been more favorable. 
III. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON AND TAMPERING 
WITH EVIDENCE CONVICTIONS. 
Harley asserts finally that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
possession of a dangerous weapon and tampering with evidence convictions. 
Harley does not dispute that he was a convicted felon. He stipulated to this 
fact as part of trial, in part to shield his criminal history from the jury and avoid any 
visceral, negative reaction. However, Harley claims that the State did not adduce 
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evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had dominion or control over a 
handgun. Conviction of a felony and dominion or control over a dangerous weapon 
are the two essential elements of the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a). 
The evidence supporting the jury's verdict on this charge is limited to 
testimony given by Darrell Jenkins. Jenkins testified that Harley had a pistol in his 
hand at one point when Harley and Gooch confronted his father and him outside the 
rear of the house. Tr. 214,11. 4-5. He also testified that it was Harley who lowered 
the gun when Harley and Gooch decided to leave the scene. Tr. 217,11. 4-7. 
This marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Darrell Jenkins gave conflicting 
testimony as to whether Harley or Gooch had possession of the gun. Jenkins 
testified at trial that Gooch, at least initially, had the gun in his hand. Tr. 214,1. 20. 
He admitted, on cross-examination, that his testimony on this point appeared to be 
inconsistent with a statement that he gave an investigating officer immediately after 
the incident. Tr. 224,11. 3-11. Ted Jenkins testified that he himself never saw either 
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Harley or Gooch with a gun. Tr. 204,11. 18-20; 207,11. 18-20. Betty Jenkins 
testified that she never saw Harley or Gooch with a gun. Tr. 327,11. 17-19. The 
gun that police recovered had no fingerprints on it, even though Harley, at the time 
of his arrest, was not wearing rubber gloves. Tr. 306,11, 18-19; 249 f. A trace of 
ownership of the gun, by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, failed to 
establish any link between the gun and Harley. Tr. 307,1. 18 f. 
Evidence that Harley adduced at trial was more than sufficient to establish 
reasonable doubt in the jury regarding the element of Harley's dominion and control 
over a gun. The jury, properly, should have found him not guilty of the charge of 
possession of a dangerous weapon. 
The jury also should have found Harley not guilty of the charge of tampering 
with evidence, personally or as a party. The State admitted, in closing argument, 
that "our weakest case is the evidence tampering case...." Tr. 375,11. 4-5. Indeed, 
the only evidence supporting the jury's verdict on the charge was Darrell Jenkins' 
testimony that Harley was the last person who had the gun when Harley and Gooch 
left. Tr.217. 
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All other evidence adduced by both the State and Harley supports the view 
that Gooch, acting alone, threw the gun from the getaway vehicle. There can be no 
doubt that there was a gun in the vehicle, whether or not Harley or Gooch had 
possession of it during the interaction with Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins. Police 
observed a gun come out a window. However, it came out the passenger window. 
Tr. 243,11. 20-21. Harley was driving. Gooch was sitting in the passenger seat. Tr. 
278,11. 11-20; 246,11. 14-25. The van which Harley and Gooch were in had bucket 
seats. Tr. 255,1. 10. There was a distance of two feet between the seats. Tr. 255, 
11. 11-16. The gun was found within two feet of the edge of the pavement, just off 
the road that Harley was on. Tr. 247,11. 1-5; 259,1. 22 to 260,1. 1. The reasonable 
inference, the only reasonable inference, to be drawn from these facts is that Gooch 
dropped the gun from the passenger window as the van was in motion. Harley 
would have had to throw the gun across the inside of the vehicle, and across 
Gooch's body, and with such force that it is unlikely that the gun would have landed 
as close to the road as it did. This assumes, too, that Harley had the opportunity to 
throw the gun out. Such a view is not supported by Darrell Jenkins' testimony that, 
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as he followed the van, Harley was speeding up to 85 miles per hour. Tr. 220,1. 22 
f. 
The State adduced no evidence, and did not argue, that Harley asked, urged 
or encouraged Gooch to throw the gun out the window. It based its argument, 
again, on the claim that Harley was in possession of the gun when he and Gooch 
prepared to leave the Jenkins' house. This one fact, even if true, is insufficient to 
convict Harley of tampering with evidence, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse Harley's convictions on all counts and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
DATED this l day of November, 1998. 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Kidnaping, Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon, and Tampering with Evidence Statutes 
76-6-203 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am Ju r 2d Burglary 
§ 10 
C.J.S. — 12A C J S Burglary § 5 
A.L.R. — Breaking and entering of inner 
door of building as burglary, 43 A L R 3d 1147 
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking 
into or taking money or goods from vending 
machine or other com operated machine, 45 
A L R 3 d 1286 
Mainta'nabihtv of burglarv charge, where 
entry into building is made with consent, 58 
A L R 4th 335 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) Apersonisguilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or 
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the 
crime, 
ib) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against 
any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon 
(2) Aggra\ ated burglary is a first degree felony 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon** has the same definition as 
under Section 76-1-601. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, enacted by L. 
1973, ch . 196, $ 76-6-203; 1988, ch. 174, § 1; 
1989, ch . 170, * 6. 







—Effect of error 
Lesser included offense 
Liability of all participants 
Sentencing 





Defendant caused 'bodily injury" under this 
section when he struck victim in the mouth 
with a closed fist, knocking him off balance and 
drawing blood State v Boone, 820 P2d 930 
(Utah Ct App 1991) 
Evidence . 
—Sufficient. 
Evidence was su^icient to prove the criminal 
intent required for aggravated burglary State 
v Featherson, 781 P2d 424 (1989) 
Intent. 
See notes under this catchline at § 76-6-202 
Judgment . 
—Effect of e r r o r . 
Although the trial courts oral judgment of 
"aggravated burglar\ a third degree felony 
was in error as not conforming to the charge, 
the jurv verdict, or the s ta tu te because defen 
dant's conviction was properh corrected in the 
subsequent written judgment there was no 
basis to amend the written judgment to con-
form to the oral judgment Parrv \ State, 837 
P2d 998 (Utah Ct App 1992 
Lesse r inc luded offense. 
Aggravated assault constituted a lesser and 
included offense of aggravated burglarv where 
the jury was instructed that to find defendant 
guilty of aggravated burglarv it must find that 
he used or threatened the immediate use of a 
dangerous or deadly weapon against a person 
and the jury was not required to find any 
additional elements to convict defendant of 
aggravated assaul t once it had found him guilty 
of aggravated burglarv State % Bradlev, 752 
P2d 874 (Utah 1988) " 
Liability of all participants . 
A defendant was properly charged with ag-
gravated burglary based on the fact that an-
other participant in the crime w a? know inglv in 
possession of a dangerous weapon State v 
Seel, 827 P2d 954 (Utah Ct App J. cert denied, 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-302 
76-5-301.1. Child kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits child kidnaping when the person intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, hy any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports a child under 
the age of 14 with intent to keep or conceal the child from its parent, guardian, 
or other person having lawful custody or control of the child. 
(2) A seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation is deemed to be 
against the will of the victim if the victim is younger than 14 years of age at the 
time of the offense, and the seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation, 
is without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent, guardian, or 
person acting in loco parentis. 
(3) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section 
(4) Child kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term 
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years, and 
which may be for life 
History: C. 1953. 78-5-301.1, e n a c t e d by L. 
1983, ch. 88, $ 14; 1984, ch. 18, * fi. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Evidence . 
—Admiss ible . 
Evidence of defendant's sexual assaults on 
the victim were properly admitted at his trial 
for child kidnaping, because the evidence was 
directly probative of the proposition that defen-
dant took the victim out of the state with the 
requisite intent and without a good faith belief 
that he had implied permission from the child's 
parents State v Shickles, 760 P2d 291 (Utah 
1988) 
Ci ted in State v Bishop, 717 P2d 261 (Utah 
1986) 
fia zyi tu tan I^*-* 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liahilif. of legal or natural parent, 
or one who aids and aheis for damages result-
u g from abduction A own child, 49 A L R 4th 7 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
Q) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim 
with intent 
(a) to huld for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel 
a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging 






Subsection (4) is not unconstitutional (1) it is 
not cruel and unusual punishment on the the-
ory that the sentences are disproportionate to 
the crime of kidnaping, (2> it does not infringe 
on inherent judicia power and authonty, (3) it 
does not invade trie provnce of the Board of 
Pardons, and 14 t r e sentencing scheme is not 
^consti tut ional^ -.ague ^tate v Shickles, 760 
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76-5-303 CRIMINAL CODE 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terronze the victim or another, or 
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit 
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the 
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the 
victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term 
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years and 
which may be for life. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12; 
1983, ch. 88, § 15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Sentence. 
Lesser included offenses -Constitutionality. 
~
 A A , . The aggravated kidnaping minimum manda-
—Constitutionality . * . , . , 
Tr i i , tory sentencing provision is constitutional 
Cited S t a t e v R u s s e l l> 7 9 1 P 2 d 1 8 8 ( U t a h 1 9 9 0 ) 
Lesser included offenses. —Upheld. 
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnap- Concurrent 15-year minimum mandatory 
mg was entitled to a jury instruction on assault sentences for aggravated kidnapping and ag-
as a lesser included offense since there was gravated sexual assault found not cruel and 
sufficient overlap in elements of two offenses unusual punishment See State v Russell, 791 
and if jury had accepted defendant's version of P2d 188 (Utah 1990) 
evidence, however unlikely that might have 
been, it could have voted to acquit him of Cited in State v DePlonty, 749 P2d 621 
aggravated kidnaping and to convict him of (Utah 1987), State v Babbell, 770 P2d 987 
assault State v Brown, 694 P2d 587 (Utah (Utah 1989), State v Archuleta, 850 P2d 1232 
1984) (Utah 1993) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 5 1 C J S Kidnapping § 1 of statutes increasing penalty for kidnaping 
AX.R. — What is "harm" within provisions where victim suffers harm, 11 A L R 3d 1053 
76-5-303. Custodial interference. 
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, 
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under 
the age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian 
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and 
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than 




is unlawful to di .-barge 
5 tha t a firearm • .r other 
lin such close pn ximity 
nd used as readily as if 
;ans a shotgun having a 
., or in the case of a rifle, 
iches in length, or any 
by alteration, modifica-
in overall length of fewer 
>sible fin* immediate use, 
:ontainc« whether or not 
tor vehu ' , not including 
i and fired i 





>; in Sub.^ 
id and thi. 
sentence, 
from enfon 
ss, regulat ' 
:hange in p-
endment, . i* 
(2)<fi substii 
>r "Law En I 
* for "Sectiot 
,' the use of a single 
^designations and 
' ch. 285, effective 




 sentences for the 
irh prohibited a 
,:,«. or enacting cer-
.,-;. or rules; and 
i ;.-tuation. 
live May 4, 1998, 
.-.ied "Criminal In-
i, ement" and "Sec-
r.:j-5-103.w 
crime but does not change the 
le offense. Suite v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 
App. 1995). 
weapon." 
knife, whirl, was about 9 1/2 
eluding a 4 I ' :<- l» blade, was a 
lapon within t! . meaning of the 
j v. Pugmire, .v...i P.2d 271 (Utah 
), cert, denied. H) H2d 425 (Utah 
>sion, or transfer of 
<VL.R.5th 664. 
"assault 
1 4 7 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 3 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Ci ted in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1995). 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat . 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
.History: C. 1953, 76-10-503, enacted by L. Amendment Notes . — The 1997 amend-
1973, ch. 196, $ 76-10-503; 1977, ch. 82, § 1; 
1986, ch. 210, § 1; 1990, ch. 160, § 1; 1991, 
ch. 17, § l ; 1 9 9 1 , c h . 8 7 , § 5; 1993, ch. 62, § 2; 
1994, ch. 19, § 2; 1994, ch. 149, § 2; 1997, ch. 
289, § 12. 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "Sec-
tion 76-10-501" for "this part" in Subsections 
(IMa) and (2)(a) and made a stylistic change in 
Subsection (3)(b). 
OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT 76-8-510 
76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro-
ceeding. 
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use of force or 
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of theft 
by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain property, or 
by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to induce an 
alleged victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a 
criminal complaint, indictment, or information. 
(2) "Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person under 
the care or custody of a parent or guardian. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-509, enacted by L. bribery, to prevent criminal prosecution, § 76-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-509. 8-308. 
Cross-References. — Accepting bribe, or 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, A.L.R. — Criminal liability of corporation for 
Blackmail, and Threats § 50. extortion, false pretenses, or similar offense, 49 
C.J.S. — 86 C.J S. Threats and Unlawful A.L R.3d 820 
Communications § 4. Key Numbers. — Threats «=» 1(1). 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence. 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with 
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a 
proceeding or investigation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-510, enacted by L. 








Defendant's swallowing a bag that the police 
had taken into custody impaired the availabil-
ity of that evidence for any resulting proceeding 
or investigation irrespective of its admissibility 
against defendant at trial. State v. Wagstaff, 
846 R2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Insufficient. 
Defendant's conviction of attempted tamper-
ing with evidence was reversed, because the 
evidence of guilt was so slight, so conflicting, 
and so inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds could not have concluded that defendant 
rejected a fire investigation report in an at-
tempt to alter, destroy, conceal or remove it to 
impair its verity or availability, rather than 
rejecting it because it was a "bad report." State 
v Harman, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
— Sufficient. 
Evidence that a police officer had intention-
ally manipulated a breathalyzer machine in 
order to obtain a false reading was sufficient to 
sustain a conviction for tampering with evi-
dence. State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985). 
Evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude 
that defendant knowingly or intentionally at-
tempted to induce a fire marshal to withhold a 
report on a fire from an official investigation or 
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Attachment B 
State's Concession, at Preliminary Hearing, 
that Harley Did Not Enter the Jenkins' House 
1 that night after listening to counsel, Judge. I'll respond to 
2 counsel's more technical arguments regarding Mr. Gooch. I 
3 believe the testimony was that he was the passenger in the 
4 vehicle. The gun was thrown out the passenger side. We have 
5 charged him as being a party to having possession of a 
6 firearm. I think there is sufficient evidence to get us past 
7 the preliminary hearing on that one. 
8 THE COURT: I don't think you can charge him with 
9 being a party to that offense. 
10 MS. STRINGHAM: I wondered about that. But we 
11 still have the evidence that he was in the passenger side. 
12 The gun went out the window, I would like to remind the Court, 
13 probably don't have to with the Pledger cases and the 
14 inferences that should be made in favor of the State. As far 
15 as the conviction goes, it shows that he was convicted for 
16 five years to the Texas Department of Corrections. Anything 
17 over one year is usually considered felony punishment in this 
18 state and other states. 
19 I have not read the case cited by Mr. Baden. Just 
20 -- and I would like that opportunity to do that if the Court's 
21 inclined to agree with his reasoning. Your Honor, looking at 
22 the plain meaning of the statute, the plain meaning of 
23 aggravated burglary, plain language is a person is guilty of 
24 aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing or fleeing 
25 from a burglary, the actor or another participant causes 
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1 bodily injury to any person or uses or threatens the immediate 
2 use of a dangerous weapon. The aggravated burglary statute, I 
3 would submit, the legislature intentionally broadened it 
4 because when a dangerous weapon is used it's a much more 
5 serious situation. They have broadened that to include 
6 attempt, committing, or fleeing from a burglary. So in this 
7 case, there was no entry into the house, but there certainly 
8 was an attempt. We have the testimony that at least one of 
9 these defendants, probably both of these defendants repeatedly 
10 said, Get in the house. Let's get in the house. The Jenkins 
11 were held at gun-point for 13 to 15 minutes, forced to walk to 
12 the back of the house. The gun was held on them. It fits the 
13 statutory definition of attempting to commit a burglary. We 
14 also have Mr. Harley's interview where he said that they were 
15 going to get 1- to $3 million that was hidden somewhere. We 
16 have the fact that these two defendants arrived at the scene 
17 with all of the material necessary to subdue people. They had 
18 the gun, they had the duct tape. 
19 They had two -- Mr. Harley had two pair of 
20 handcuffs on his person. We have rope. We have a flashlight. 
21 We have everything that you would normally think of as being 
22 used to subdue people and keep them under their control. It 
23 doesn't matter whether or not Mr. Jenkins, the Jenkinses or 
24 whether or not these defendants thought they were committing a 
25 robbery. That doesn't matter. The Court has to look at the 
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1 fact that it shouldn't matter at all, legal elements of each 
2 crime. And I would submit that this crime definitely fits the 
3 aggravated burglary and the aggravated kidnapping. This was 
4 much more than just an interaction, Judge, when people are 
5 held at gun-point. When Mr. Jenkins is smashed in the head 
6 with something, his arms twisted back, believed they were 
7 trying to get both arms behind him, forced at gun-point to go 
8 to the back door, I believe we have more than met our burden 
9 for purposes of preliminary hearing. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. 
11 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Your Honor, may I say two 
12 things? 
13 THE COURT: Yes. 
14 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: First of all, Your Honor, it 
15 appears to me from the paper that Mrs. Stringham submitted on 
16 Mr. Gooch that the original charge of possession of heroin was 
17 dismissed, and that was the charge that had the five year 
18 sentence. That the marijuana charge that he was convicted of 
19 appears to have a two year sentence. 
20 Second of all, there has been no testimony that the 
21 items, that the coat that the items were found in upon arrest 
22 were worn by Mr. Harley at the scene, that the items 
23 Mr. Jenkins was discussing were recovered from the coat 
24 Mr. Harley was wearing 40 miles up the canyon, Your Honor. So 
25 there is no evidence that any of the items, the handcuffs, 
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